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Midair Refueling for Sensation Seeking?  
Pilot CEOs and Corporate Debt Contracting 
Abstract 
 
We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) sensation seeking, which captures 
the desire for varied, novel, and complex personal sensations and experiences, and corporate debt 
contracting. Using pilot certificates as a proxy for the personality trait of sensation seeking, we 
find that firms with pilot CEOs use longer maturity debt financing even when long-term debt is 
more costly than short-term debt. Our findings are robust to controlling for the endogenous 
matching between firms and CEOs. Our evidence indicates that CEOs with sensation-seeking 
personality traits prefer long-term debt financing to avoid the liquidity risk associated with short-
term debt financing that may hamper other corporate activities motivated by their sensation 
seeking. 
 
JEL classifications: G32, G34 
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Managers’ personality traits can affect corporate policies and their outcomes. Previous 
studies report that chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence relates significantly to corporate 
risk-taking and financial reporting (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012; 
Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Using CEOs’ pilot certifications as a proxy for their sensation 
seeking, Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2017) document that firms led 
by sensation-seeking CEOs are associated with risk-increasing corporate policies. Specifically, 
these authors find that firms with sensation-seeking CEOs are more likely to engage in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As), have higher financial leverage, invest more in research and development 
(R&D), and have more patents and citations.  
Debt maturity is an important component of corporate financial policy and closely related 
to firm liquidity, real investments, and shareholder value (Johnson, 2003; Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu, 
2005; Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2014). Previous studies document that creditors shorten the 
maturity and increase the cost of debt provided to firms with high-powered managerial incentives 
to mitigate the effects of corporate risk-taking induced by such managerial incentives (Billet, 
Mauer, and Zhang, 2009; Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010). However, no prior research has 
investigated the relation between CEO sensation seeking and corporate debt contracting. In this 
study, we investigate the relation between CEO sensation-seeking personality traits, proxied by 
CEO's pilot certificate, on corporate debt maturity structure and the cost of debt. 
We develop two competing hypotheses regarding the relation between CEO sensation- 
seeking personal trait and corporate debt maturity. In the risk-taking hypothesis, we predict that 
firms with pilot CEOs have higher short-term debt ratios than firms with nonpilot CEOs. Previous 





studies document that pilot CEOs have sensation-seeking personalities (Zuckerman, 1971) and 
pursue riskier corporate policies than nonpilot CEOs (Cain and McKeon, 2016; Sunder et al., 
2017). To the extent that short-term debt is associated with lower cost, albeit higher refinancing 
risk (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond, 1991; Benmelech 2007), the risk-taking hypothesis 
suggests that firms with pilot CEOs may favor short-term debt financing. Alternatively, since 
external creditors are likely to be concerned about the risk-taking behavior of sensation-seeking 
CEOs that increases the borrowing firms’ risk of default, they may prefer to lend shorter term debt 
and subject the borrowing firms to more frequent refinancing. This argument also suggests a 
negative relation between pilot CEOs and corporate debt maturity.  
Our second hypothesis, labeled liquidity concern hypothesis, is motivated by the idea that 
sensation-seeking behavior is more nuanced and not necessarily associated with risk-seeking 
across all corporate policies. Sensation seekers can be motivated by risk, but risk-taking is a means 
rather than the ultimate goal of the trait; indeed, sensation seekers are willing to overlook or 
tolerate risk to obtain novel experiences (Zuckerman, 1994, 2007, 2009).1 For example, pilot 
CEOs may pursue innovations (Sunder et al., 2017) or acquisitions (Cain and McKeon, 2016) to 
satisfy their desire for sensation despite the fact that such risk-increasing behavior may increase 
the firm's bankruptcy risk and adversely affect the shareholder's interest. The liquidity concern 
hypothesis predicts that firms led by pilot CEOs have lower short-term debt ratios than firms led 
by nonpilot CEOs. Short-term debt restricts managerial discretion due to the need to refinance 
 
1 Even if some sensation-seekers are driven by risk-taking, not all gambles are equally attractive. Lopes (1987) argues 
that attitude towards risk is governed not just by fear of loss but also by sensitivity to opportunity. If CEO’s sensation-
seeking behavior is rooted in the latter, then it might manifest in the pursuit of risky corporate policies where skill and 
effort can influence the outcome, but not necessarily in the funding for those pursuits.   





more frequently (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond, 1991). Furthermore, Roberts and Sufi 
(2009) find that over 90 percent of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to maturity. For 
these reasons, a pilot CEO may choose longer debt maturity, even at a higher cost, because it 
reduces refinancing risk, allows firms to renegotiate debt terms in bad states of the world, and 
facilitates CEOs’ sensation-seeking behavior in potentially more novel corporate decisions than 
debt contracting. In addition, since firms desire to match asset-liability maturity (Aivazian et al., 
2005), firms led by pilot CEOs are more likely to use long-term debt to fund long-run investments 
such as M&As. Since the two hypotheses lead to opposing relations between CEOs’ sensation-
seeking personality trait and corporate debt maturity, we need to sort them out empirically.  
To examine the two competing hypotheses regarding the corporate debt maturity structure 
of firms led by pilot CEOs, we estimate regressions of the short-term debt ratios on a Pilot CEO 
indicator while controlling for other variables that explain short-term debt financing. Similar to 
Cain and McKeon (2016), we construct a Pilot CEO binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO of a firm holds a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilot certification at any point in 
time and 0 otherwise. The short-term debt measure is calculated as the proportion of debt maturing 
within one year using firms’ balance sheet data. For robustness, we use alternative measures of 
short-term debt, which are proxied by the proportion of short-term debt maturing within two, three, 
four, or five years. 
Using a sample of 15,181 firm-year observations of 1,875 unique firms over the period 
1994-2014, we find a negative and significant relation between pilot CEOs and short-term debt 
ratios. This finding is robust to alternative measures of short-term debt and to controlling for 
potential endogenous matching between CEOs and firms. The negative relation between pilot 
CEOs and corporate short-term debt persists when we control for potential omitted variables 





including CEO overconfidence, military experience, managerial ability, economic recessions, 
capital supply, and corporate governance measures. Our estimation indicates that firms with pilot 
CEOs have about 3-7% less short-term debt compared to firms with nonpilot CEOs. This evidence 
supports the liquidity concern hypothesis. 
Previous studies suggest that firms are not likely to change their leverage and debt maturity 
structure frequently (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007). Thus, the negative relation 
between pilot CEOs and short-term debt ratios may be a result of past decisions. Guedes and Opler 
(1996) suggest that it is more useful to employ new debt issues to investigate the determinants of 
corporate debt maturity because this approach can mitigate the short-term debt measurement error 
due to maturing long-term debt. Following their recommendation, we examine the effect of pilot 
CEOs on the maturity of new debt issues. We run a regression of Bond maturity on Pilot CEO and 
other control variables, where Bond maturity is measured as the natural logarithm of the years to 
maturity of new debt issues, and find that firms with pilot CEOs issue new debt with longer 
maturities, which is consistent with our findings based on balance sheet data. The economic effect 
of sensation-seeking CEOs on debt maturity is also noteworthy: Our coefficient estimates indicate 
that the maturity of new debt issues by the firms with pilot CEOs is 1.94 to 8.03 years longer than 
that of the firms with nonpilot CEOs. 
Firms with pilot CEOs and firms with non-pilot CEOs could be systematically different, 
and their debt maturity structures may diverge even without the pilot CEOs appointments. To 
address this concern, we consider a firm that appoints a pilot CEO during the sample period as a 
treatment firm. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to identify control firms that are similar 
to the treatment firms along several observable dimensions but have nonpilot CEOs throughout 
the sample period. We run the debt maturity regressions using the difference-in-differences 





approach and the propensity score-matched sample. The analysis results indicate that the effect of 
pilot CEOs on debt maturity is significant only after the pilot CEOs appointments but not 
beforehand. 
We next investigate the relation between pilot CEOs and the cost of debt using the new 
debt issue data. The risk-taking behavior of sensation-seeking CEOs can lead to volatile future 
cash flows that potentially harm external creditors’ interests. Consequently, creditors may demand 
higher risk premiums as compensation for the additional risk they have to take when lending to 
firms with pilot CEOs. Thus, we predict a positive relation between pilot CEOs and the costs of 
new debt issues. We use Yield spread, which is measured as the difference between a corporate 
bond’s yield to maturity and that of a Treasury bond with similar maturity, as a proxy for the cost 
of debt. The estimation results of the yield spread regressions indicate a positive relation between 
pilot CEOs and the cost of new debt issues, which is consistent with our prediction. We further 
estimate a simultaneous equation that allows debt cost and maturity to be jointly determined, but 
our findings are qualitatively similar. In an alternative analysis, we find a positive relation between 
pilot CEOs and payment default risk proxied by its distance-to-default, which corroborates the 
positive relation between pilot CEOs and the cost of debt. 
Our paper contributes to the finance literature in several ways. We add to an established 
line of research in corporate financing that considers the determinants of corporate debt maturity 
structure (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Johnson, 2003) by demonstrating that managerial 
behavioral motivations also have explanatory power for debt maturity. Our evidence indicates that 
firms led by sensation-seeking CEOs, proxied by their pilot certification, prefer long-term debt 
financing to avoid the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt financing, even though long-
term debt is generally costlier. Our research also adds to a growing stream of literature that 





examines the effects of a manager’s personality traits on corporate decisions (Malmendier, Tate, 
and Yan, 2011; Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2012). Previous research reports that firms with 
sensation-seeking CEOs are associated with risk-increasing behavior in investments and financial 
leverage (Cain and McKeon, 2016; Sunder et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study providing evidence that CEOs’ sensation-seeking personality traits do not translate into 
across-the-board risk-increasing corporate activities. Our research provides innovative evidence 
about the precaution that sensation-seeking CEOs exercise when they decide on debt maturity. Our 
finding implies that pilot CEOs’ precautions in debt financing would help facilitate their sensation-
seeking behavior and that the effects of CEO personality traits on corporate policies are more 
nuanced than previously documented. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the 
sample selection, variable construction, and summary statistics. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
predictions, research methods, and results. Section 4 discusses the robustness tests and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Samples, Variables Construction, and Descriptive Statistics 
We construct a sample using several data sources to investigate how CEOs with sensation-
seeking personality traits, proxied by their pilot certificates, influence different aspects of 
corporate debt contracting. First, we obtain CEO names and compensation data from the Standard 
& Poor’s ExecuComp database. Then, we hand-collect CEO pilot certificate data by matching 
CEO names to names on the FAA’s Airmen Certification database. For verification, we use 
Bloomberg and public records to obtain the CEOs’ dates of birth and home addresses. Following 
Cain and McKeon (2016), we exclude CEOs who assumed their positions before 1992 to avoid 





any survivorship bias problems. Additionally, we omit any CEOs whose names are matched in the 
FAA database but cannot be verified by the date of birth or home address. The debt maturity 
sample and new debt data are obtained from Compustat and Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum, 
respectively. We obtain stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database. We also use the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database to retrieve short-
term and long-term government bond yields. Our sample spans the period 1994 through 2014.  
  Following the literature, we exclude utility firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes 4900-4999) and financial corporations (SIC codes 6000-6999) from our sample since they 
tend to be highly regulated. We also filter out firm-year observations with missing debt and book 
value of assets. The final sample includes 15,181 firm-year observations of 1,875 unique firms.2 
The sample consists of 656 pilot CEO-year observations of 119 pilot CEOs and 14,525 nonpilot 
CEO-year observations of 2,777 nonpilot CEOs. The number of CEOs is higher than the number 
of firms in the Execucomp database because a firm may change its CEO during our sample period. 
The primary test variable in this research, Pilot CEO, is an indicator that takes the value of 
1 if the CEO of a firm holds an FAA pilot certification at any point in time and 0 otherwise. 
Following prior research (e.g., Johnson, 2003; Brockman et al., 2010), we use the ratios of debt 
 
2 The original sample of ExecuComp has 38,045 observations during our sample period. The number of observations 
decreases to 29,987 after deleting utility firms and financial corporations. The sample has 22,651 observations after 
filtering out those who became CEOs before 1992 to avoid any survivorship bias problems since the Excecucomp 
database is available from 1992. Our sample size decreases to 19,538 observations after we drop any CEOs whose 
names are matched in the FAA database but cannot be verified by the date of birth or home address. Finally, after 
deleting any firms with missing short-term debt, book value of assets, or other independent variables, our final sample 
includes 15,181 firm-year observations of 1,875 unique firms. 





maturing within one year or debt maturing within four years to total debt, labeled ST1 and ST4 
respectively, as measures of short-term debt in our analysis. In robustness tests, we also consider 
the ratios of debt maturing within two, three, five years, or debt in current liabilities excluding the 
current portion of long-term debt to total debt. We control for the following variables in the 
regressions: firm size, firm size squared, market-to-book, abnormal earnings, asset maturity 
structure, asset volatility, firm leverage, R&D expenses, R&D missing indicator, and the term 
premium of interest rates (Johnson, 2003; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2005; Brockman et 
al., 2010; Custódio, Ferreira, and Laureano, 2013a; Harford et al., 2014). Appendix A provides the 
definitions of the variables. To mitigate the effects of outliers, we winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Table 1 reports the annual and 2-digit SIC code industry distributions of pilot CEOs in 
Panels A and B, respectively. The number of pilot CEOs increased rapidly from 9 observations in 
1994 to a peak of 43 in 2005 before decreasing slightly in recent years. Industries that have relative 
large number of pilot CEOs include business services, industrial machinery and equipment, 
chemical and allied products, electronic and other electric equipment, transportation equipment, 
transportation by air, trucking and warehousing, communications, general merchandise stores, and 
wholesale trade-nondurable goods. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We report the summary statistics of the sample in Panel A of Table 2. The means of ST1 
and ST4 are 18.9% and 51.5%, respectively. The summary statistics for alternative measures of 
short-term debt and other control variables are similar to those reported by Datta et al. (2005) and 
Brockman et al. (2010). On average, 50% of CEOs are overconfident while only 4.5% of CEOs 
have military experience. The average CEO age and CEO tenure are 55 and 9.14 years, 





respectively. In Panel B of Table 2, we report the coefficients of the pairwise correlations of Pilot 
CEO and other CEO characteristics. The results indicate that Pilot CEO is positively correlated 
with military experience and CEO tenure but insignificantly correlated with CEO overconfidence, 
CEO age, and managerial ability.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3. Empirical Predictions, Research Methods, Results, and Discussions 
3.1. Pilot CEOs and Debt Maturity Structure 
We develop two competing hypotheses about the relation between pilot CEOs and 
corporate debt maturity. Both hypotheses stem from the assumption that CEOs with pilot 
certificates have sensation-seeking personalities (Zuckerman, 1971; Cain and McKeon, 2016; 
Sunder et al., 2017). Zuckerman (1994) defines the sensation-seeking personality trait as “the 
seeking of varied, novel, complex and intense sensation and experiences, and the willingness to 
take physical, social, legal and financial risk for the sake of such experience”, but he also points 
out that “risk-taking behavior is a correlate of sensation seeking but not an essential part of the 
definition" (Zuckerman, 1994). In subsequent studies, Zuckerman reiterates that many sensation 
seekers do not seek risk for its own sake; some sensation seeking activities are not even risky, 
while for others that are, the risk is accepted because it enables the ultimate goal of novel sensations 
and experiences (Zuckerman, 2007, 2009). One non-business activity that exemplifies sensation-
seeking with risk avoidance is mountaineering which, along with piloting an airplane, appears on 





Zuckerman's sensation seeking scale (Zuckerman, 1971).3   
The willingness of sensation seekers to engage in greater risk-taking has been examined in 
the finance literature. Using prior speeding convictions as a proxy for sensation-seeking, Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2009) find that investors with speeding convictions trade more frequently. Brown 
et al. (2018) use automotive ownership as a proxy for sensation-seeking and find that hedge-fund 
managers as well as investors in hedge funds that own high-torque or high-horsepower sports cars 
take on greater investment risk.  
Using CEO pilot certificates as a proxy for managers’ risk-taking, Cain and McKeon 
(2016) document that a CEO’s flying hobby is associated with higher fatality rate.4 These authors 
find that compared to firms with nonpilot CEOs, firms with pilot CEOs engage in riskier corporate 
behavior, such as pursuing M&As or maintaining higher financial leverage, and experience higher 
stock return volatility. These findings imply that pilot CEOs with a sensation-seeking personality 
are likely to pursue risky corporate policies to satisfy their desire for sensation even though such 
risk-increasing behavior may increase the firm’s bankruptcy risk and adversely affect 
 
3 Mountaineers seeking to conquer Mt. Everest, with a fatality rate exceeding 4%, need to acclimatize to avoid life 
threatening cerebral or pulmonary edema by making multiple trips up and down the mountain as their bodies adapt to 
the lack of oxygen at extreme altitudes (Woodward 2019). Although climbers aim to achieve their sensation-seeking 
goal of reaching the peak, they often practice risk-mitigation such as acclimating on nearby peaks and ridges rather 
than make multiple trips through the treacherous direct route to the summit through the Khumbu Ice Fall, fraught with 
objective danger such as avalanches, falling ice, or deep crevasses (Mallory 2016).  
4 Some examples of pilot CEOs who lost their lives include Steven Appleton CEO of Micron (2012), Daniel Dorsch, 
former CEO of Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. (2009),  Bruce R. Kennedy, former CEO of Alaska Airlines 
(2007),  Michael A. Chowdry, CEO of Atlas Air, Inc. (2001), among others (Cain and McKeon, 2016). 






In the risk-taking hypothesis, we predict that firms with pilot CEOs have higher short-term 
debt ratios than those with nonpilot CEOs. Short-term debt, which typically has lower cost, 
exposes firms to higher refinancing risk because firms need to roll over debt more frequently 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond, 1991). Given that short-term debt is associated with higher 
liquidity risk but lower cost, the risk-taking hypothesis suggests that firms with pilot CEOs may 
favor short-term debt financing. In addition, creditors may also be concerned about the risk-taking 
behavior of pilot CEOs and reduce their risk exposure by lending short-term debt. These 
discussions suggest a positive relation between pilot CEOs and short-term debt financing.  
Our second hypothesis, the liquidity concern hypothesis, predicts that firms led by pilot 
CEOs have lower short-term debt ratios than firms with nonpilot CEOs. Short-term debt could be 
an effective monitoring mechanism that restricts managerial discretion because it exposes firms to 
refinancing risk and increases creditors’ controlling power (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond, 
1991). Sensation-seeking CEOs will prefer long-term financing to short-term financing if greater 
discretion and lower refinancing risk allows them to pursue future M&As (Cain and McKeon, 
2016) or innovative investment strategies (Sunder et al., 2017) more freely.5 Long-term debt allows 
more flexibility in debt renegotiations (Roberts and Sufi, 2009) and better asset-liability maturity 
matching (Aivazian et al., 2005), both of which can better support long-run novel and varying 
corporate investment policies. O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) suggest that pilots analyze the 
decision to continue a flight carefully and make critical decisions depending on anticipated 
 
5 In an unreported analysis, we find positive relations between pilot CEOs and corporate innovation and M&As for 
our sample firms. 





outcomes. In the same manner, CEO pilots may forego the riskiest financing to increase their 
flexibility to pursue their ultimate sensation-seeking goals. The foregoing discussions suggest that 
firms with pilot CEOs may prefer long-term debt due to its low refinancing risk, the possibility of 
debt contract renegotiation, and asset-liability maturity matching. Given the possible opposing 
effects of pilot CEOs on corporate debt maturity, we need to sort them out empirically.  
To examine the relation between the CEOs with pilot certificates and corporate debt 
maturity, we estimate the following regression model: 
STit = β0 + β1*Pilot CEOi  + β2*Sizei,t-1 + β3*Size squaredi,t-1 + β4*Market-to-booki,t-1 + 
β5*Abnormal earningsi,t-1 + β6*Asset maturityi,t-1 + β7*Asset volatilityi,t-1 + 
β8*Leveragei,t-1 + β9*R&Di,t-1 + β10*Missing R&Di,t-1 + β11*Term premiumi,t-1 + 
β12*Credit ratingi,t-1 + εijt                              (1) 
 The dependent variable is short-term debt ratio estimated as the fraction of the firm i’s total 
debt maturing within one year (i.e., ST1) or within four years (i.e., ST4), respectively. The variable 
of interest is the Pilot CEO indicator, which is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO of a firm holds an FAA pilot certification at any point in time and 0 otherwise. We follow 
previous studies (e.g., Johnson, 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Brockman et al., 2010; Custódio et al., 
2013a; Harford et al., 2014; Dang and Phan, 2016) to include control variables such as firm size, 
firm size squared, market-to-book, abnormal earnings, asset maturity structure, asset volatility, 
firm leverage, R&D expenses, R&D missing dummy, the yield spread between 10-year and 6-
month government bonds’ yields, year fixed effects, and 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects. 
We additionally control for credit ratings, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 for firms 
with below investment-grade or no credit ratings and 0 otherwise. Appendix A provides the 





definitions of the variables.  
Turning to the control variables, previous studies suggest that larger firms are more likely 
to have good credit quality and lower information asymmetry (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; Johnson, 
2003; Dang and Phan, 2016), which suggests that larger firms are less likely to use short-term debt 
financing. To account for a possible nonlinear relation between a firm’s credit quality and debt 
maturity structure, we control for firm size squared (Diamond, 1991; Dang and Phan, 2016). Myers 
(1977) argues that high growth firms are more likely to use short-term debt financing to reduce the 
underinvestment problem, thus, we expect that market-to-book ratio is positively related to short-
term debt. Since firms with larger abnormal earnings may use short-term debt financing to signal 
their financial strength (Flannery, 1986), we expect a positive relation between abnormal earnings 
and short-term debt ratio. We further expect asset maturity to be negatively related to corporations’ 
short-term debt ratio since firms are more likely to match the maturities of their assets and 
liabilities (Myers, 1977; Aivazian et al., 2005). Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985) and Dang 
and Phan (2016) report that firms with higher earnings volatility are less likely to use short-term 
debt to avoid liquidity risk. Similarly, higher leveraged firms are less likely to use short-term debt 
to reduce refinancing risk (Johnson, 2003). Previous studies also suggest a positive relation 
between corporate R&D spending and short-term debt ratio since higher R&D spending is 
positively related to information asymmetry (Custódio et al., 2013a). Because many firms have 
missing R&D spending in Compustat, we replace missing R&D observations with zeros and add 
an R&D missing indicator which takes the value of 1 if R&D expenditure is missing and 0 
otherwise (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Prior studies suggest a negative relation between the term 
premium and short-term debt ratio since firms are more likely to take advantage of longer-term 
debt financing for tax purposes when the term structure of interest rate is upward sloping (Brick 





and Ravid, 1991; Dang and Phan, 2016).  
We run the regression of ST1 (ST4) on the Pilot CEO indicator while controlling for other 
variables that explain short-term debt financing and report the results in Columns 1-3 (Columns 
4-6) of Panel A, Table 3. We find that the coefficient estimates of Pilot CEO are negative (ranging 
from -0.018 to -0.080) and statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, which indicates that 
firms with pilot CEOs have lower short-term debt ratio. The coefficient estimates indicate that, 
depending on the model specification, firms with pilot CEOs have approximately 2-5% (5-7%) 
less debt in their capital structure maturing within one (four) years. The effects of other control 
variables on corporate short-term debt are in line with those reported in the literature (Johnson, 
2003; Brockman et al., 2010). Specifically, firm size, asset maturity, asset volatility, financial 
leverage, and term premium are negatively related to the short-term debt ratio, while size squared, 
market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditure, and the credit rating indicator are positively related to the  
short-term debt ratio.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In additional analysis, we re-estimate the short-term debt baseline regressions with 
alternative proxies for short-term debt, which include the ratio of total debt maturing within two, 
three, or five years, or debt in current liabilities, excluding the current portion of long-term debt 
scaled by total debt. The estimation results reported in Panel B of Table 3 indicate that the 
coefficients of Pilot CEO remain negative and statistically significant, implying that the negative 
relation between pilot CEOs and short-term debt is robust to alternative measures of short-term 
debt ratio.  
3.2. Pilot CEOs and Maturity of New Debt Issues  
Previous research suggests that firms do not change their leverage and debt maturity 





structure frequently (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007). It is possible that the negative 
relation between pilot CEOs and short-term debt is a result of past decisions. Guedes and Opler 
(1996) point out that it is more useful to employ new debt issues to examine the determinants of 
corporate debt maturity because this approach can mitigate the short-term debt measurement error 
due to maturing long-term debt. Thus, we further examine the effect of the Pilot CEO indicator on 
the maturity of newly issued debt using the following regression model: 
Bond maturityit = θ0 + θ1*Pilot CEOi  + θ2*Sizei,t-1 + θ3* Size squaredi,t-1 + θ4*Market-to-
booki,t-1 + θ5*Abnormal earningsi,t-1 + θ6*Asset maturityi,t-1 + θ7*Asset 
volatilityi,t-1 + θ8*Leveragei,t-1 + θ9*R&Di,t-1 + θ10*Missing R&Di,t-1 + 
θ11*Term premiumi,t-1 + θ12*Credit ratingi,t-1 + εijt                (2) 
We construct the dependent variable, Bond maturity, as the natural logarithm of the number 
of years to maturity of new corporate bond issues.6 Other control variables are similar to those in 
the short-term debt baseline regressions, which include firm size, firm size squared, market-to-
book, abnormal earnings, asset maturity structure, asset volatility, firm leverage, R&D expenses, 
R&D missing indicator, the yield spread between 10-year and 6-month government bonds, credit 
rating indicator, and year and industry or firm fixed effects. 
The estimation results of the bond maturity regressions reported in Table 4 indicate that 
the coefficients of Pilot CEO are positive and statistically significant, implying that firms with a 
pilot CEO are more likely to issue debt with longer maturities. This evidence is consistent with the 
 
6 Similar to previous research on debt maturities, our sample includes only straight debt and excludes callable, puttable, 
and convertible bonds. 





liquidity concern hypothesis. The economic effect of pilot CEO on debt maturity is also important: 
Using the coefficient estimates in Table 4 for calculation, we find that the maturity of new debt 
issues by firms with pilot CEOs is 1.94 to 8.03 years longer than that of firms with nonpilot CEO. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
3.3. Pilot CEOs and Cost of New Debt Issues 
We next investigate the relation between pilot CEOs and the cost of debt using the new 
debt issue data. The risk-taking behavior of pilot CEOs can lead to volatile future cash flows, 
which harms external creditors’ interests. Consequently, creditors may demand higher risk 
premiums as compensation for the additional risk they have to take when lending to firms with 
pilot CEOs. Following this argument, we predict a positive relation between pilot CEOs and the 
costs of new debt issues. Following Dang and Phan (2016), we use the following model to examine 
the relation between pilot CEOs on the cost of newly issued debt: 
Yield spreadit = γ0 + γ1*Pilot CEOi  + γ2*Bond maturityit + γ3*Sizei,t-1 + γ4*Size squaredi,t-1 
+ γ5*Asset volatilityi,t-1 + γ6*Average returni,t-1 + γ7*Credit ratingi,t-1 + 
γ8*ROSi,t-1 + γ9*Leveragei,t-1 + γ10*Interest coveragei,t-1 + γ11*Issue size i,t-
1 + γ12*Term premiumi,t-1 + εijt                            (3) 
The dependent variable, Yield spread, is measured as the difference between a corporate 
bond’s yield to maturity and that of a Treasury bond with similar maturity. Control variables that 
capture firm and bond characteristics include firm size, firm size squared, standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns, average daily return, bond rating, return on sales, firm leverage, interest 
coverage ratio, issue size, yield spread between 10-year and 6-month government bonds, year fixed 





effects, and 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects (Brockman et al., 2010). The results of the cost 
of debt regressions reported in Columns 1-3 of Table 5 indicate a positive relation between Pilot 
CEO and Yield spread, which is consistent with our prediction that firms with pilot CEOs pay 
higher cost of debt for their new bond issues, ceteris paribus. The results also hold after controlling 
for Bond maturity.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Bond maturity and the cost of new debt issues can be jointly determined, which raises an 
endogeneity concern that biases our coefficient estimates. We address this endogeneity concern in 
two ways. First, we use a two-stage estimation procedure with the first stage modeling bond 
maturity and the second stage modeling the yield spread of new issues (Dang and Phan, 2016). 
The estimated results of the second stage reported in Column 4 of Table 5 indicate that the 
coefficient of Pilot CEO remains positive (0.013) and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
implying that the positive relation between pilot CEOs and the cost of new debt issues is robust to 
correction for potential endogeneity. Second, we estimate the bond maturity and cost of debt 
regressions jointly using a simultaneous equations model. The results reported in Column 5 are 
qualitatively similar and consistent with the view that lenders recognize that pilot CEOs tend to 
pursue riskier corporate investment policies, therefore, they charge higher interest rates. 
4. Robustness Checks 
4.1. Other Endogeneity Concerns 
Corporate debt maturity and financial leverage can be determined simultaneously, which 
raises another endogeneity concern (Barclay et al., 2003; Johnson, 2003; Billett, King, and Mauer, 
2007). To dispel this concern, we follow previous studies (e.g., Johnson, 2003; Aivazian et al., 
2005; Datta et al., 2005; Brockman et al., 2010) and employ an instrumental variable (IV) 





regression using asset tangibility as an instrument for financial leverage. Asset tangibility satisfies 
both the relevance and exclusion conditions of an instrument because tangible assets are an 
important determinant of financial leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009), but it is not theoretically 
related to debt maturity structure (Aivazian et al., 2005; Dang and Phan, 2016). Specifically, we 
estimate financial leverage as a function of asset tangibility and other explanatory variables in the 
first stage. Then, we run a regression of ST1 or ST4 on the predicted level of financial leverage, 
Pilot CEO, and other control variables.7 We report the results of the IV regressions in Columns 1 
and 2 for ST1 and ST4, respectively, in Table 6. The negative and significant coefficient estimates 
of Pilot CEO indicate that our findings continue to hold. In an alternative analysis, we estimate the 
debt maturity and financial leverage regressions jointly using a simultaneous equation model. The 
results, reported in Columns 3 and 4, are qualitatively similar. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
It is possible that firms select CEOs with personality traits that fit firm characteristics (e.g., 
risky firms select pilot CEOs) (Benmelech and Frydman, 2015); thus, our observed results may be 
due to firm effects rather than CEO effects. Moreover, firms are not likely to change their corporate 
debt maturity structure frequently (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007), implying that our 
results could be driven by past financing decisions. Although our debt maturity regressions have 
controlled for firm fixed effects, to further address concerns about a possible endogenous matching 
between firms and CEOs with pilot certificates, we follow Sunder et al. (2017) and re-estimate the 
short-term debt ratio baseline regressions that additionally control for firm short-term debt ratio in 
the year preceding the current CEO’s appointment. By controlling for the firm’s short-term debt 
 
7 The Cragg-Donald Wald weak identification test statistic indicates that the selected instrument is relevant. 





level when the previous CEO was in charge, other firm characteristics, and firm fixed effects, we 
can attribute the effect of pilot CEOs on debt maturity to the current CEO. The results reported in 
Table 7 indicate that the coefficient estimates of Pilot CEO remain negative and statistically 
significant. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the negative relation between pilot CEO 
and short-term debt is unlikely to be driven by endogenous matching between firms and CEOs. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Firms with pilot CEOs and firms with non-pilot CEOs could be systematically different, 
and their debt maturity structures may follow different trends even without the pilot CEOs 
appointments. To alleviate this concern, we use the PSM approach to identify control firms that 
are similar to the treatment firms along several observable dimensions, such as firm size, market-
to-book, abnormal earnings, asset maturity structure, asset volatility, firm leverage, R&D 
expenses, and credit ratings. Specifically, we classify firms that replace non-pilot CEOs with pilot 
CEOs during the sample period as treatment firms and firms with non-pilot CEOs throughout the 
sample period as potential control firms. We use a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a firm 
being a treatment one based on firm characteristics. For each treatment firm, we select control 
firms that are in the same 3-digit SIC industry and have a propensity score within 1% of that of 
the treatment firm. We rerun the short-term debt regressions using the propensity score-matched 
sample and report the results in Columns 1-3 of Panel A of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix. 
Treatment is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the firms that replace non-pilot CEOs 
with pilot CEOs during the sample period and 0 otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that takes 
a value of 1 for the year in which a firm has a pilot CEO and 0 otherwise. The results indicate that 
the coefficients of the interaction between Treatment and Post are negative and statistically 
significant in all columns, which indicates that the decrease in short-term debt ratios follows the 





pilot CEOs appointments. For robustness check, we rerun the bond maturity regressions using the 
propensity score-matched sample and new bond issues and report the results in Columns 4-6 of 
Panel A of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix. The results indicate positive and significant 
coefficients of the interaction between Treatment and Post, suggesting that firms with pilot CEOs 
issue longer-term debt after their appointment. 
In a complementary analysis, we estimate dynamic bond maturity regressions using the 
propensity score-matched sample and a series of year indicators including Pilot CEO-2, Pilot CEO-
1, Pilot CEO0, Pilot CEO+1, and Pilot CEO≥+2 that are set to one if the firm will appoint a pilot 
CEO in the next two years, will appoint a pilot CEO next year, appoints a pilot CEO this year, 
appointed a pilot CEO one year ago, and appointed a pilot CEO two or more years ago, 
respectively. The results reported in Panel B of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix indicate that 
the effects of pilot CEOs on debt maturity are significant only after the pilot CEOs appointments. 
Figure 1 plots the coefficients of the year dummies of the regression of debt maturity for the nine-
year period centered on the pilot CEO appointments using the new debt issues sample. The dashed 
lines correspond to the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates. The figure indicates 
that the positive and significant effect of pilot CEOs on the debt maturity of the treatment firms is 
only present after their appointments but not beforehand. 
4.2. Other Personality Traits and Possible Omitted Variables 
Pilot CEO could be correlated with other personality traits, such as CEO overconfidence, 
CEO military experience, or CEO general managerial ability (Sunder et al., 2017), and it may 
simply pick up the effects of these personality traits on debt maturity. To rule out the possibility 
that Pilot CEO merely picks up the effect of CEO overconfidence, we re-estimate the corporate 





debt maturity regressions while additionally controlling for CEO overconfidence. Similar to 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Cain and McKeon (2016), we construct the CEO overconfidence 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO’s options exceed 100% moneyness and 0 
otherwise. The results reported in Panel A of Table 8 indicate that the coefficients of Pilot CEO 
remain negative and highly significant while CEO overconfidence is generally positively related 
to corporate short-term debt.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
In the next analysis, we address the possible omitted variable problem arising from CEO 
military experience. Similar to Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder et al. (2017), we use CEO 
military background in manager biographical data reported in the Boardex database to construct 
the Military experience indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has military 
experience and 0 otherwise. We then estimate the corporate debt maturity models while 
additionally controlling for CEO military background. The results reported in Panel B of Table 8 
indicate that the negative relation between pilot CEOs and short-term debt ratios persists. On the 
other hand, CEO military experience is positively related to corporate short-term debt ratios, which 
could be explained by the risk-taking behavior of CEOs with military experience. 
Another potential omitted variable problem arises from CEO managerial ability being 
potentially correlated with both CEO personality traits and debt maturity structure. We address 
this concern by estimating the short-term debt model while additionally controlling for CEOs’ 
managerial abilities proxied by the CEO ability index developed by Custódio et al. (2013b). The 
estimation results reported in Panel C of Table 8 indicate that the negative relation between pilot 
CEOs and short-term debt is robust to controlling for CEO ability. In addition, CEO general 
managerial ability is positively related to corporate short-term debt, which could be explained by 





skillful CEOs’ willingness to roll over their firms’ short-term debt. In another robustness test, we 
rerun the short-term debt model while controlling for all three CEO personality traits in the same 
regression and report the results in Panel D of Table 8. The estimation results indicate that the 
coefficients of Pilot CEO are negative and highly significant in all columns, suggesting that the 
negative relation between pilot CEOs and short-term debt is insensitive to controlling for other 
CEO personality traits. 
Datta et al. (2005) and Brockman et al. (2010) argue that corporate governance and 
managers’ equity-based incentive compensation are important determinants of corporate debt 
maturity structure and bond yield spreads. In the next analysis, we examine the robustness of our 
findings by estimating the corporate debt maturity regressions while controlling for CEO 
performance-based compensation, including CEO delta and CEO vega, and other corporate 
governance measures, including aggregate blockholder ownership and the anti-takeover G-index 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) or the entrenchment E-index (Bebchuk , Cohen, and Ferrell, 
2009).8 The estimation results reported in Table 9 indicate that the negative relation between pilot 
CEOs and short-term debt ratio is statistically significant and robust to controlling for corporate 
governance. The coefficient estimates of corporate governance measures are consistent with the 
evidence reported in the literature. Specifically, short-term debt ratio is negatively (positively) 
related to CEO delta and blockholder ownership (CEO vega) (Brockman et al., 2010). 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
4.3. Distance-to-default 
 
8 Because GIM index and E-index are available until 2006, the regression samples reported in Panel B of Table 9 are 
smaller. 





Our findings so far indicate that firms with pilot CEOs are more likely to use longer-term 
debt even though it is costlier during our sample period (as reported in Table 5). One potential 
mechanism that could explain our findings is that firms with pilot CEOs take on more risk (Cain 
and McKeon, 2016; Sunder et al., 2017), experience more cash-flow volatility, and are more likely 
to default compared to other firms. Because pilot CEOs seek sensation by pursuing activities that 
increases firm risk and consequently default risk, which hampers their firms’ ability to repay or 
refinance short-term debt, they may prefer longer term debt even at higher costs.  
In our next analysis, we investigate the relation between pilot CEOs and firms’ default risk. 
Specifically, we calculate the distance-to-default using the Kealhofer-Merton-Vasicek (KMV) 
model, which measures a firm’s default probability (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). We regress the 
distance-to-default on Pilot CEO and control variables and report the results in Table 10. We find 
that the coefficients of Pilot CEO  are negative (-0.642 and -0.773) and significant at the 5% and 
1% levels, indicating that firms led by pilot CEOs are closer to default than those led by nonpilot 
CEOs. Taken together, the evidence indicates that firms with pilot CEOs have higher default risks, 
leading to higher costs of debt imposed by the creditors. Faced with higher liquidity risk associated 
with short-term debt that adversely affects their sensation seeking, pilot CEOs choose to borrow 
longer term debt even through it is costlier. This evidence also implies that the positive relation 
between pilot CEO and debt maturity is driven by the demand side rather than the supply side. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
4.4. Economic and Credit Market Conditions 
During our sample period, government bond yields decline during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis before rising from 2009 to 2012. Firms may have greater incentives to use short-term debt 
financing during the period of declining rates compared to those in the periods of increasing 





interest rates (Dang and Phan, 2016). Moreover, whereas the availability of long-term debt is more 
limited during financial recessions, firms may have to resort to more short-term debt financing in 
the crisis years (Gonzalez, 2015). These observations suggest that the negative relation between 
pilot CEOs and corporate short-term debt ratios may vary with the market conditions. We control 
for the effect of financial crisis by including a recession indicator, which takes the value of 1 for 
the financial crisis years (i.e., years 2001, 2007, 2008 and 2009) and 0 otherwise, in the short-term 
debt model and rerun the regressions. The results reported in Panel A of Table A2 in the Online 
Appendix suggest that the coefficient estimates of Pilot CEO remain negative and highly 
significant, implying that the negative relation between pilot CEOs and short-term debt is not 
sensitive to the dry-up of long-term debt during the financial crises. Consistent with the evidence 
in the literature (e.g., Gonzalez, 2015), the coefficient estimate of the recession indicator is positive 
and highly significant, indicating that firms are more likely to use short-term debt financing during 
the periods of financial crisis.  
We further estimate the short-term debt regressions separately for the recession and growth 
sub-periods then compare the effects of pilot CEOs on corporate short-term debt ratio during these 
sub-periods. The recession and growth periods are defined by the NBER business cycles. The 
estimation results reported in Panel B of Table A2 indicate that pilot CEOs are negatively related 
to corporate short-term debt ratios in both the recession and growth subperiods although the 
relation is more pronounced during the recession subperiod.  
The existence of an inverse yield curve during the sample period may bias our findings 
because firms would be better off using longer term debt, which is cheaper than shorter term debt. 
To address a possible effect of the inverse yield curve on the relation between pilot CEOs and 
corporate debt maturity, we split the sample into the inverse yield curve and normal yield curve 





sub-periods and re-estimate the debt maturity regressions separately for each subsample. The 
estimated results reported in Table A3 in the Online Appendix suggest that pilot CEOs  are 
significantly negatively related to corporate short-term debt ratio in both sub-periods, implying 
that the results are insensitive to the shape of the yield curve. 
 In another analysis, we re-estimate the short-term debt ratio models while additionally 
controlling for the money supply M2 and report the results in Table A4 in the Online Appendix. 
The results indicate that the coefficient estimates of Pilot CEO remain negative and highly 
significant, which confirms the robustness of our findings. The results also indicate that money 
supply has a negative effect on corporate short-term debt ratio. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This research examines the effect of CEO sensation-seeking personality traits, proxied by 
CEOs’ pilot certificates, on corporate debt maturity structure and the cost of debt. We find that 
firms with pilot CEOs have lower short-term debt ratios than those with nonpilot CEOs, and this 
finding is robust to alternative measures of short-term debt and to controlling for endogenous 
matching between firms and pilot CEOs. The negative relation between the pilot CEOs and 
corporate short-term debt persists after controlling for potential omitted variables, CEO 
overconfidence, CEO military experience, CEO managerial ability, economic and credit market 
conditions, corporate governance, and  prior debt maturity structure. Our findings support the 
liquidity concern hypothesis that pilot CEOs prefer long-term debt to avoid the liquidity risk 
associated with short-term debt financing. Further analysis of a new debt issues sample indicates 
that firms with pilot CEOs issue longer term debt although it is generally costlier than shorter term 
debt. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the argument that sensation-seeking CEOs prefer 





long-term debt financing to avoid the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt financing that 
may hamper their sensation-seeking behavior. External creditors respond to the risk-taking and 
uncertainty of the future cash flows of firms with pilot CEOs by imposing a higher cost of debt.  
 
  






Appendix A: Variable Definition 
Variable Description   
Dependent variables 
 
ST1 The ratio of debt maturing within 1 year to total debt.  
ST2 The ratio of debt maturing within 2 year to total debt.  
ST3 The ratio of debt maturing within 3 year to total debt.  
ST4 The ratio of debt maturing within 4 year to total debt.  
ST5 The ratio of debt maturing within 5 year to total debt.  
STNP The ratio of debt in current liability minus the current portion of 
long-term debt, to total debt.  
Bond maturity The natural logarithm of the number of years from the date of 
issuance to the date of maturity.  
Yield spread The difference between yield to maturity of new corporate bond 
issues and the yield to maturity of a Treasury bond with similar 
maturity.   
Independent variables 
 
Pilot CEO   An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO of a firm 
holds a FAA pilot certification at any point in time, and 0 
otherwise.  
Size  The natural logarithm of the total book value of assets.  
Market-to-book ratio  The ratio of the sum of the market value of equity, preferred stock, 
current liabilities, and long-term debt minus deferred taxes, to the 
total book value of asset.  
Abnormal earnings  Difference between common stock (capital) adjusted income 
before extraordinary items at year t and t – 1, all divide by the 
market value of equity.  
Asset maturity  The weighted average of gross long-term fixed assets and current 
assets.   
Asset volatility  The standard deviation of the stock return (during the fiscal year) 
times the market value of equity, all divided by the market value 
of assets.  
Leverage The ratio of book value of total debt to the book value of asset.  
R&D  The ratio of research and development expenditure to total book 
value of asset.  
Missing R&D  An indicator which takes a value of 1 if R&D expenditure is 
missing and 0 otherwise.  
Term premium The difference between the 10-year government bond yield and 6-
month government bond yield.  
Credit rating The average of the S&P’s and Moody’s ratings. We code ratings 
as 1 for “Aaa” (Moody’s) or “AAA” (S&P), or 2 for “Aa1” 





“AA+” and so on increasing the number assigned by one for each 
lower rating level.   
Lagged ST1 The firm's ST1 in the year before the CEO appointment.  
Lagged ST4 The firm’s ST4 in the year before the CEO appointment.  
ROS The ratio of operating income before depreciation to sale.  
Interest coverage The natural logarithm of 1 plus the pre-tax interest coverage ratio, 
ln(1+interest expense/EBIT).  
Issue size The natural logarithm of the total proceeds of new debt issues.  
Average return Average monthly stock return during the fiscal year.  
PPE The ratio of total book value of property, plant, and equipment to 
book value of assets. 
CEO overconfidence An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO’s options 
have a higher than 100% moneyness and 0 otherwise. The 
definition follows Hirshleifer et al. (2012). Moneyness is defined 
from ExecuComp as [PRCC_F-
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL/OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM)]/ 
[OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL/OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM] 
and option value is estimated as 
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE/OPTION_AWARDS_NUM. 
Military experience An indicator that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has military 
experience and 0 otherwise. 
Managerial ability The CEO general managerial ability index developed by Custódio, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2013b). 
GIM index The corporate governance index developed by Gompers, Ishii, 
Metrick, (2003), measures the number of anti-takeover provisions 
adopted by a firm. 
Blockholder ownership The percent of shares owned by blockholders who each hold at 
least 5% of the firms’ common equity. 
CEO delta A measure of the CEO’s wealth’s sensitivity to a $1 change in the 
stock price. 
CEO vega  A measure of the CEO’s wealth’s sensitivity to a 0.01 change in 
stock returns volatility. 
E-index Entrenchment index developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009), measuring the adoption of six important anti-takeover 
provisions. 
Recession An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for the recession 
periods (i.e. years 2001, 2007, 2008 and 2009) and 0 otherwise. 
Money supply M2 A measure of the money supply, obtained from St. Louis Federal 
Reserve FRED database. 
CEO Age The natural logarithm of the CEO’s age. 
CEO tenure  The number of years the CEO has been in his position. 
Net debt issuance The ratio of the change in total liabilities to total book value of 
assets. 
 





Credit rating An indicator variable that equals 1 for firms with below 
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Figure 1: Dynamic Effects of Pilot CEOs on Debt Maturity Structure 
Figure 1 plots the coefficients of the year dummies of the regression of debt maturity on 9-year 
dummies beginning 4 years before and ending 4 years after the pilot CEOs appointments and other 
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 Distribution of Pilot CEO by Year and Industry 
This table reports the yearly and two-digit SIC code industries distribution of number of CEOs, 
number of pilot CEOs and percentage of pilot CEOs for the period of 1994-2014. 
Panel A: Pilot CEOs Distribution by Year 
Year Number of CEOs Number of Pilot CEOs Percentage of Pilot CEOs 
1994 302 9 2.98 
1995 398 12 3.02 
1996 486 18 3.7 
1997 520 24 4.62 
1998 590 26 4.41 
1999 641 29 4.52 
2000 691 35 5.07 
2001 703 33 4.69 
2002 723 35 4.84 
2003 771 31 4.02 
2004 773 36 4.66 
2005 778 43 5.53 
2006 809 40 4.94 
2007 901 41 4.55 
2008 910 38 4.18 
2009 894 42 4.7 
2010 861 34 3.95 
2011 869 33 3.8 
2012 863 33 3.82 
2013 850 30 3.53 
2014 848 34 4.01 
Total 15,181 656 4.32 
Panel B: Pilot CEOs Distribution by Industries 






     
73 Business Services 1,436 61 4.25% 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 1,124 43 3.83% 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 1,415 42 2.97% 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 1,182 41 3.47% 
37 Transportation Equipment 512 41 8.01% 
45 Transportation by Air 161 33 20.50% 
42 Trucking & Warehousing 127 31 24.41% 
48 Communications 518 31 5.98% 





53 General Merchandise Stores 244 25 10.25% 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 221 23 10.41% 
38 Instruments & Related Products 983 21 2.14% 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 162 21 12.96% 
Other   7,096 243 3.42% 
     
Total   15,181 656 4.32% 






 Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
This table reports the summary statistics of the full sample over the period of 1994-2014. ST1 is 
the ratio of debt maturing within 1 year to total debt. ST2 is the ratio of debt maturing within 2 
years to total debt. ST3 is the ratio of debt maturing within 3 years to total debt. ST4 is the ratio of 
debt maturing within 4 years to total debt. ST5 is the ratio of debt maturing within 5 years to total 
debt. STNP is the ratio of debt in current liability excluding the current portion of long-term debt 
to total debt. Market-to-book ratio is ratio of the sum of the market value of equity, preferred stock, 
current liabilities, and long-term debt minus deferred taxes, to the total book value of asset. 
Abnormal earnings is measured by difference between common stock (capital) adjusted income 
before extraordinary items at year t and t–1, all divided by the market value of equity. Asset 
maturity is calculated as the weighted average of gross fixed assets and current assets. Asset 
volatility is constructed as the ratio of standard deviation of stock return times the market value of 
equity, to the market value of asset. Leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to the book 
value of asset. R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditure to total book value of 
asset. Term premium is the difference between the 10-year government bond yield and 6-month 
government bond yield. The definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Std. Dev. 
ST1 15,181 0.189 0.009 0.072 0.250 0.265 
ST2 13,447 0.295 0.045 0.183 0.432 0.313 
ST3 13,417 0.405 0.119 0.316 0.641 0.338 
ST4 13,063 0.515 0.229 0.468 0.868 0.343 
ST5 13,127 0.634 0.376 0.641 0.998 0.324 
STNP 15,520 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.208 
Size ($million) 15,181 6,668 572 1,608 5,088 15,683 
Market-to-book 15,181 1.592 0.870 1.245 1.880 1.155 
Abnormal earnings 15,181 -0.009 -0.015 0.006 0.022 0.183 
Asset maturity 15,181 9.183 3.039 6.258 12.658 8.536 
Asset volatility 15,181 0.070 0.040 0.059 0.087 0.045 
Leverage 15,181 0.245 0.113 0.229 0.345 0.177 
R&D 15,181 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.034 0.049 
Term premium 15,181 0.026 0.007 0.017 0.028 0.012 
Overconfidence  15,181 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
Military experience 15,181 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 
CEO age 15,181 54.901 50.00 55.00 59.00 6.831 
CEO tenure 15,181 9.137 6.000 9.000 12.000 4.698 
CEO delta 10,059 945.62 59.320 179.68 524.88 4722.92 
CEO vega 10,059 131.58 12.055 43.541 130.06 298.07 
 





Panel B: CEO Characteristics Correlations Matrix 
 Pilot CEO Military experience Overconfidence Ability Age  
Pilot CEO 1     
Military experience 0.063*** 1    
Overconfidence 0.005 0.037*** 1   
Managerial ability -0.046* 0.078*** 0.011 1  
Age -0.008 0.115*** -0.035*** 0.204*** 1 
Tenure 0.031*** 0.041*** -0.091*** -0.131*** 0.053*** 
 
 






 Pilot CEOs and Short-term Debt 
This table reports the results of the short-term debt regressions. The dependent variables in Panel 
A are ST1 and ST4. ST1 is the ratio of debt maturing within 1 year to total debt. ST4 is the ratio of 
debt maturing within 4 years to total debt. The dependent variables in Panel B are ST2, ST3, ST5 
and STNP. ST2 is the ratio of debt maturing within 2 years to total debt. ST3 is the ratio of debt 
maturing within 3 years to total debt. ST5 is the ratio of debt maturing within 5 years to total debt. 
STNP is the ratio of debt in current liability excluding the current portion of long-term debt to total 
debt. Pilot CEO is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO of a firm holds a FAA 
pilot certification at any point in time, and 0 otherwise. The definitions of other variables are 
provided in Appendix A. T-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Pilot CEOs and Short-term Debt: Baseline Regressions 
  ST1   ST4 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.018** -0.047*** -0.049***  -0.025** -0.080*** -0.079*** 
 (2.28) (3.33) (3.48)  (1.99) (3.55) (3.50) 
Size -0.151*** 0.002 0.003  -0.251*** -0.039 -0.057* 
 (9.93) (0.11) (0.16)  (16.28) (1.34) (1.95) 
Size squared 0.009*** -0.001 -0.001  0.013*** 0.001 0.002 
 (10.74) (1.13) (0.24)  (14.28) (0.47) (1.24) 
Market-to-book 0.013*** 0.004 0.006*  0.012*** -0.012** -0.002 
 (4.96) (1.27) (1.70)  (3.40) (2.52) (0.44) 
Abnormal earnings -0.019 -0.002 0.001  -0.026** -0.040*** -0.01 
 (1.34) (0.16) (0.14)  (2.26) (2.71) (0.70) 
Asset maturity -0.001* 0.001  0.001**  -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001  
 (1.81) (0.87) (2.33)  (5.24) (0.93) (0.29) 
Asset volatility -0.126 0.084 -0.013  -0.319*** 0.262** -0.226* 
 (1.55) (1.15) (0.15)  (3.95) (2.49) (1.90) 
Leverage -0.353*** -0.248*** -0.253***  -0.329*** -0.021 -0.070** 
 (16.07) (12.48) (12.32)  (12.61) (0.67) (2.20) 
R&D 0.234*** 0.417** 0.500***  0.141 0.007 -0.04 
 (3.61) (2.51) (3.00)  (1.32) (0.03) (0.19) 
Missing R&D -0.005 -0.014 -0.017  -0.002 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.73) (1.16) (1.35)  (0.17) (0.75) (0.71) 
Term premium -0.007*** -0.007*** (0.10)  -0.015*** -0.007*** 0.115 
 (8.00) (4.07) (1.12)  (15.36) (3.12) (0.72) 
Credit rating 0.016*** 0.006 0.013*  0.032*** 0.003 0.003 





 (3.18) (0.88) (1.82)  (3.17) (0.23) (0.24) 
Constant 0.838*** 0.303*** 0.392*  1.940*** 0.796*** 0.557  
 (13.80) (3.56) (1.73)  (11.26) (6.52) (1.45) 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 15,181 15,181 15,181  13,063 13,063 13,063 
Adjusted R-squared 0.16  0.43 0.43   0.19 0.37 0.39 
 
Panel B: Pilot CEOs and Alternative Measures of Short-term Debt 
  ST2 ST3 ST5 STNP 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pilot CEO -0.046** -0.065*** -0.047** -0.036*** 
 (2.57) (3.05) (2.14) (3.42) 
Size -0.084*** -0.112*** 0.006 0.048*** 
 (3.12) (3.92) (0.25) (3.02) 
Size squared 0.004** 0.005*** -0.002 -0.003*** 
 (2.45) (3.13) (1.27) (2.99) 
Market-to-book 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.59) (0.30) (0.61) (0.70) 
Abnormal earnings 0.001 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.43) (0.74) 
Asset maturity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.87) (0.32) (0.50) (4.14) 
Asset volatility -0.093 -0.188 -0.188* -0.055 
 (0.86) (1.62) (1.81) (0.89) 
Leverage -0.295*** -0.229*** -0.153*** -0.120*** 
 (10.69) (7.45) (5.05) (8.37) 
R&D 0.144 0.108 0.257 0.220* 
 (0.72) (0.51) (1.32) (1.73) 
Missing R&D  -0.017 -0.026 -0.013 -0.018* 
 (1.04) (1.37) (0.62) (1.77) 
Term premium -0.186 -0.067 -0.02 -0.001 
 (1.55) (0.43) (0.15) (0.01) 
Credit rating 0.003 0.005 0.019 0.007 
 (0.30) (0.41) (1.57) (1.26) 
Constant 1.136*** 1.098*** 0.785** -0.115 
 (3.83) (2.93) (2.34) (0.70) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,149  13,120  12,834  15,181  
Adjusted R-squared 0.43  0.40  0.45  0.49  
 






 Pilot CEOs and Maturities of New Debt Issues 
This table reports the estimated results of the maturities of new debt issues regressions. The 
dependent variable is Bond Maturity, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number 
of years from the date of issuance to the date of maturity. Pilot CEO is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the CEO of a firm holds a FAA pilot certification at any point in time, and 0 
otherwise. The definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO 0.173* 0.177* 0.223** 0.224** 0.715*** 0.688** 
 (1.88) (1.87) (2.46) (2.37) (2.76) (2.51) 
Size 0.058 0.112 0.028 0.042 0.283 0.13 
 (0.53) (1.03) (0.21) (0.31) (0.68) (0.31) 
Size squared -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.51) (0.91) (0.31) (0.33) (0.73) (0.78) 
Market-to-book -0.047** -0.051** -0.038* -0.038* -0.054 -0.061 
 (2.30) (2.49) (1.65) (1.65) (0.94) (1.02) 
Abnormal earnings 0.016** 0.001 0.020** 0.004 0.016 -0.008 
 (2.09) (0.14) (2.07) (0.34) (1.43) (0.71) 
Asset maturity 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 
 (3.20) (3.07) (0.34) (0.77) (0.80) (0.74) 
Asset volatility -0.327 0.835 -0.859 0.18 -0.993 -0.001 
 (0.59) (1.28) (1.49) (0.27) (1.15) (0.05)  
Leverage -0.255*** -0.113 -0.212* -0.042 -0.408* -0.111 
 (2.65) (1.19) (1.92) (0.38) (1.66) (0.43) 
R&D 0.288 0.135 0.503 0.292 -0.004 -0.021 
 (0.31) (0.14) (0.51) (0.28) (0.09)  (0.01) 
Missing R&D 0.029 0.016 0.045 0.043 0.078 0.083 
 (0.72) (0.40) (0.80) (0.76) (0.54) (0.61) 
Term premium 0.023  (0.04) 0.024* -0.041 0.031* 0.042  
 (1.43) (1.62) (1.77) (1.61) (1.66) (1.23) 
Credit rating -0.078** -0.083** -0.108*** -0.118*** 0.012  -0.042 
 (2.29) (2.33) (2.97) (3.15) (0.10) (0.43) 
Constant 2.031*** 1.841*** 2.713*** 2.475*** 1.30  2.69  
 (4.17) (3.69) (5.45) (4.79) (0.78) (1.51) 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No 
Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,388  1,388  1,388  1,388  1,388  1,388  
Adjusted R-squared 0.02  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.04  0.06  
 






 Pilot CEOs and Cost of New Debt Issues 
This table reports the estimated results of the yield spread regressions. The dependent variable is 
Yield Spread, which is measured as the difference between yield to maturity of new corporate bond 
issues and the yield to maturity of a Treasury bond with similar maturity. Pilot CEO is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO of a firm holds a FAA pilot certification at any point in 
time and 0 otherwise. Bond Maturity is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of years 
from the date of issuance to the date of maturity. The definitions of other variables are provided in 
Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 








Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pilot CEO  0.001* 0.001* 0.008** 0.013** 0.007** 
 (1.88) (1.89) (2.46) (1.99) (2.05) 
Bond maturity  0.001*  0.006*  
  (1.72)  (1.69)  
Size -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.008  0.005  0.007 
 (3.52) (3.50) (1.37) (0.63) (1.02) 
Size squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001  0.001  0.001  
 (3.37) (3.36) (1.62) (0.32) (1.04) 
Asset volatility 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.018  0.073***  0.021**  
 (4.92) (4.94) (1.09) (4.02) (2.08) 
Average return -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.058*** -0.155*** -0.07*** 
 (4.93) (4.97) (2.68) (8.98) (4.32) 
Credit rating 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (17.31) (17.26) (6.61) (9.32) (11.49) 
ROS -0.006* -0.006* -0.016* -0.017*** -0.021*** 
 (1.93) (1.96) (1.85) (3.30) (4.39) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.28) (0.24) (0.76) (0.56) (1.46) 
Interest coverage 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002  0.001  0.003**  
 (2.68) (2.67) (1.30) (0.72) (2.18) 
Issue size 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.002** 0.001* 
 (1.76) (1.72) (2.03) (2.42) (1.95) 
Term premium 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 





 (0.52) (0.57) (0.49) (1.07) (0.12) 
Constant 0.012  0.011  -0.063** -0.086** -0.053 
 (0.83) (0.76) (2.17) (2.38) (0.47) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,290  1,290  1,290  1,290  1,290  










 Pilot CEOs and Short-term Debt: Controlling for Endogeneity 
This table reports the results of the IV short-term debt 1 and short-term debt 4 regression models 
and simultaneous estimation model. The dependent variables of the second-stage regressions are 
ST1 and ST4. ST1 is the ratio of debt maturing within 1 year to total debt. ST4 is the ratio of debt 
maturing within 4 years to total debt. Pilot CEO is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the CEO of a firm holds a FAA pilot certification at any point in time and 0 otherwise. The IV 
short-term debt models use PPE as an instrument variable for financial leverage. The definitions 
of other variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  IV Regression Model  
Simultaneous Estimation 
Model 
   ST1 ST4  ST1 ST4 
Variable    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Pilot CEO   -0.027** -0.029*  -0.020* -0.031* 
  (2.03) (1.90)  (1.72) (1.74) 
Size  -0.117*** -0.237***  -0.152*** -0.255*** 
  (3.10) (8.22)  (6.70) (7.88) 
Size squared  0.007*** 0.012***  0.009*** 0.013*** 
  (3.82) (8.24)  (7.65) (7.68) 
Market-to-book  0.016*** 0.013***  0.014*** 0.012*** 
  (4.45) (3.24)  (5.40) (2.82) 
Abnormal earnings  -0.030* -0.031*  -0.015 -0.004 
  (1.73) (1.74)  (1.12) (0.22) 
Asset maturity  0.001  -0.001***  -0.001  -0.003***  
  (0.30) (2.71)  (1.50) (4.69) 
Asset volatility  -0.816 -0.659  -0.097 -0169 
  (1.17) (1.15)  (0.23) (0.25) 
Instrumented leverage  -0.934 -0.596  -0.296 -0.051 
  (1.59) (1.34)  (0.83) (0.09) 
R&D  0.305*** 0.157  0.259*** 0.294*** 
  (2.82) (1.56)  (3.57) (2.91) 
Missing R&D  0.007 0.003  -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.50) (0.26)  (0.60) (0.58) 
Term premium  -0.151 0.152  -0.011 -0.031** 
  (1.48) (0.96)  (1.24) (2.53) 
Credit rating  0.046 0.047*  0.015 0.027 





  (1.49) (1.85)  (0.80) (0.88) 
Constant  1.208*** 1.484***  1.137*** 1.911*** 
  (4.98) (4.02)  (13.10) (10.46 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  15,181 13,063  15,181 13,063 
       
Underidentification test:       
Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic  20.23*** 20.48***    
       
Weak identification test:       










 Pilot CEOs and Short-term Debt: Addressing Possible Endogenous Matching between 
Firm and CEO 
This table reports the results of the short-term debt regressions after controlling for the corporate 
short-term debt ratio in the year preceding CEO appointment. The dependent variables are ST1 
and ST4. ST1 is the ratio of debt maturing within 1 year to total debt. ST4 is the ratio of debt 
maturing within 4 years to total debt. Pilot CEO is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the CEO of a firm holds a FAA pilot certification at any point in time and 0 otherwise. Previous 
ST1 and Previous ST4 are the firm’s ST1 and ST4 in the year before the CEO takes office. The 
definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  ST1   ST4 
Variable  (1)  (2) (3)   (4) (5)  (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.051***  -0.025** -0.065** -0.062** 
 (5.29) (3.09) (3.28)  (2.49) (2.32) (2.19) 
Previous ST1 0.274*** 0.022  0.024      
 (14.33) (1.17) (0.80)     
Previous ST4     0.208*** -0.028 -0.028 
     (11.74) (1.28) (1.28) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 12,751  12,751  12,751   9,919  9,919  9,919  
Adjusted R-squared 0.22  0.43  0.43    0.22  0.38  0.40  
 
 






 Other CEO Characteristics, Pilot CEOs, and Short-term Debt 
This table reports the results of the short-term debt regressions after controlling for CEO 
overconfidence, CEO military experience, and CEO managerial general ability in Panels A, B and 
C, respectively. The dependent variables are ST1 and ST4. ST1 is the ratio of debt maturing within 
1 year to total debt. ST4 is the ratio of debt maturing within 4 years to total debt. Pilot CEO is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO of a firm holds a FAA pilot certification, 
and 0 otherwise. Overconfidence is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if CEO’s option is more 
than 100% moneyness. Military experience is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if CEO 
has military experience, and 0 otherwise. Managerial ability is an index developed by Custódio et 
al. (2013b) to measure the CEOs’ general skills. The definitions of other variables are provided in 
Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CEO Overconfidence, Pilot CEOs, and Short-term Debt 
  ST1   ST4 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.018** -0.047*** -0.049***  -0.025** -0.078*** -0.078*** 
 (2.27) (3.31) (3.49)  (1.98) (3.49) (3.44) 
Overconfidence 0.010** 0.005 -0.003  0.015*** 0.009 0.006 
 (2.52) (1.19) (0.61)  (3.30) (1.46) (0.94) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 15,181  15,181  15,181   13,063  13,063  13,063  
Adjusted R-squared 0.16  0.43  0.43    0.19  0.37  0.39  
 
Panel B: CEO Military Experience, Pilot CEOs, and Short-term Debt 
   
  Short-term debt 1 (ST1)   Short-term debt 4 (ST4) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.018** -0.047*** -0.049***  -0.026* -0.081*** -0.080*** 
 (2.15) (3.36) (3.50)  (2.06) (3.65) (3.60) 
Military experience  -0.006 0.017 0.012  0.016  0.037** 0.037** 
 (0.54) (1.36) (0.92)  (1.61) (2.06) (2.06) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 





Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 15,181  15,181  15,181   13,063  13,063  13,063  
Adjusted R-squared 0.16  0.43  0.43    0.19  0.37  0.39  
 
Panel C: Managerial Ability, Pilot CEOs, and Short-term Debt 
    
  Short-term debt 1 (ST1)   Short-term debt 4 (ST4) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.017** -0.047*** -0.048***  -0.023* -0.079*** -0.077*** 
 (2.14) (3.31) (3.47)  (1.83) (3.50) (3.44) 
Managerial ability  0.010** 0.007* 0.005  0.015*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (2.44) (1.79) (1.30)  (3.53) (3.71) (3.85) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 15,181  15,181  15,181   13,063  13,063  13,063  
Adjusted R-squared 0.16  0.43  0.43    0.19  0.37  0.39  
 
Panel D: CEO Personality Traits, Pilot CEOs, and Short-term Debt 
    
  Short-term debt 1 (ST1)   Short-term debt 4 (ST4) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.016** -0.047*** -0.049***  -0.024* -0.079*** -0.078*** 
 (1.99) (3.58) (3.94)  (1.70) (3.52) (3.46) 
Managerial ability  0.010** 0.006* 0.005  0.015*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (2.39) (1.92) (1.59)  (3.64) (3.56) (3.73) 
Overconfidence 0.010** 0.004 -0.003  0.015** 0.008 0.006 
 (2.49) (1.13) (0.62)  (2.41) (1.35) (0.90) 
Military experience  -0.008 0.015 0.011  0.013  0.033* 0.031* 
 (0.75) (1.19) (0.81)  (0.99) (1.79) (1.83) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 15,181  15,181  15,181   13,063  13,063  13,063  
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.43  0.45    0.19  0.38  0.39  
  






 Corporate Governance, Pilot CEOs, and Short-term Debt 
This table reports the results of the short-term debt regressions after controlling for corporate 
governance measures. The dependent variables are ST1 and ST4. ST1 is the ratio of debt maturing 
within 1 year to total debt. ST4 is the ratio of debt maturing within 4 years to total debt. Pilot CEO 
is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO of a firm holds a FAA pilot certification, 
and 0 otherwise. The GIM index, developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), is the number 
of anti-takeover provisions adopted by a firm. Blockholder ownership is the sum of ownership of 
blockholders who hold at least 5% of the firms’ common equity. CEO delta (CEO vega) measures 
the CEO wealth sensitivity to a $1 change in stock price (0.01 change in stock return volatility). 
The E-index, developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), is the Entrenchment Index 
measuring the adoption of six important anti-takeover provisions. The definitions of other 
variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Pilot CEOs and Short-term Debt, Controlling for CEO Delta and CEO Vega 
  Short-term debt 1 (ST1)   Short-term debt 4 (ST4) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.014* -0.039** -0.038*  -0.023* -0.141*** -0.139*** 
 (1.79) (1.99) (1.90)  (1.87) (5.31) (5.28) 
CEO delta -0.001 -0.001** -0.001**  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.38) (2.37) (2.40)  (1.04) (0.05) (0.12) 
CEO vega 0.001** -0.001 -0.001  0.001**  0.001 0.001 
 (2.36) (0.77) (0.71)  (1.98) (0.50) (0.79) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 10,059  10,059  10,059   8,530  8,530  8,530  
Adjusted R-squared 0.16  0.45  0.45    0.19  0.41  0.42  
 
Panel B: Pilot CEOs and Short-term Debt: Controlling for GIM index, Blockholder Ownership, CEO Delta, and 
CEO Vega 
  Short-term debt 1 (ST1)   Short-term debt 4 (ST4) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.053*** -0.079* -0.080*  -0.031* -0.224*** -0.233*** 
 (3.37) (1.89) (1.90)  (1.72) (3.62) (3.76) 
GIM index 0.001 0.002 0.004  -0.004* -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.37) (0.84)  (1.80) (0.67) (0.35) 





Blockholder ownership -0.038* -0.052 -0.042  -0.112** -0.059 -0.042 
 (1.65) (1.32) (1.03)  (2.41) (1.02) (0.71) 
CEO delta -0.001** 0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.25) (0.50) (0.53)  (1.10) (0.47) (0.32) 
CEO vega 0.001** 0.001 0.000*  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.46) (1.60) (1.92)  (0.04) (0.17) (0.34) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,767  3,767  3,767   3,172  3,172  3,172  
Adjusted R-squared 0.17  0.50  0.50    0.18  0.45  0.45  
 
Panel C: Pilot CEOs and Short-term Debt: Controlling for the E-index, Blockholder Ownership, CEO Delta and 
CEO Vega 
  Short-term debt 1 (ST1)   Short-term debt 4 (ST4) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pilot CEO -0.089*** -0.152*** -0.148***  -0.032 -0.253*** -0.260*** 
 (3.40) (3.13) (3.04)  (1.08) (3.66) (3.76) 
E-index 0.001 -0.004 -0.001  -0.001 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.38) (0.46) (0.03)  (0.20) (1.26) (1.19) 
Blockholder ownership -0.068** -0.105** -0.093**  -0.112** -0.09 -0.069 
 (2.85) (2.30) (2.00)  (2.16) (1.36) (1.03) 
CEO delta -0.001** -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.55) (0.26) (0.22)  (1.41) (0.77) (0.91) 
CEO vega 0.001** 0.001 0.001*  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.40) (1.35) (1.68)  (0.15) (0.34) (0.40) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No No  Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,125  3,125  3,125   2,656  2,656  2,656  










 Pilot CEOs and Distance to Default 
This table reports the results of the distance to default regressions. The dependent variable is 
distance to default, which is calculated according to the Kealhofer Merton Vasicek (KMV) model. 
Pilot CEO is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO of a firm holds a FAA pilot 
certification, and 0 otherwise. The money supply M2 is obtained from St. Louis Federal Reserve 
FRED database. The definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics based 
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
Pilot CEO -0.642** -0.773*** 
 (2.13) (3.01) 
Size -1.169*** -0.48 
 (2.76) (1.26) 
Size squared 0.088*** 0.007 
 (3.29) (0.28) 
Market-to-book 0.882*** 0.664*** 
 (4.75) (4.59) 
Abnormal earning 0.234*** 0.08 
 (3.02) (1.51) 
Asset maturity 0.003 -0.004** 
 (1.34) (2.22) 
Asset volatility -40.670*** -20.989*** 
 (20.04) (14.21) 
Leverage -14.918*** -12.720*** 
 (20.51) (19.88) 
R&D -0.966 -0.137 
 (0.63) (0.09) 
Missing R&D 0.026 0.404* 
 (0.10) (1.83) 
Term premium -0.002 2.912*** 
 (0.06) (33.01) 
Credit rating -0.633*** -1.030*** 
 (3.90) (7.27) 
Constant 17.115*** 12.892*** 
 (9.52) (7.96) 
Year fixed effects No Yes 





Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 15,181 15,181 
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